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The Impact of Changing Property Rights on 
Investment in Cloud Computing Ventures  
 
By Josh Lerner1 and Greg Rafert2 
 
Our analysis seeks to understand the impact of changing allocations of property 
rights on investment in new firms. We focus on the Cartoon Network, et al. v. 
Cablevision decision in the U.S., which narrowed the protection enjoyed by 
content creators (e.g., movie studios) and gave greater rights to downstream 
technology firms, as well as decisions in France and Germany that took an 
opposite view. Our findings regarding relative venture capital investment in the 
U.S. and Europe, across Europe, and between the various judicial circuits of the 
U.S. suggest that decisions around the allocation of property rights can have 
economically and statistically significant impacts on investment in innovative 
enterprises. 
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1. Introduction 
The ways in which the strength and allocation of property rights can affect investment 
decisions have been an enduring topic of interest (e.g., La Porta et al. [2000], Acemoglu [2003]). 
The consequences of property rights are particularly critical when evaluating intellectual 
property policies. An extensive theoretical literature suggests that shifts in the design of such 
property right schemes—in particular, the relative protection offered to initial innovators and 
those who do follow-on work—can have dramatic impacts on the rate and direction of 
technological progress. For instance, if all the rewards go to the initial innovators, other firms are 
unlikely to be able to access resources for follow-on innovations (e.g., Gilbert and Shapiro 
[1990]; Scotchmer [2004]; Hopenhayn, et al. [2006]; and, Boldrin and Levine [2008]). 
The empirical literature on the impact of changes in the nature of property rights on the 
ability to finance innovation, however, remains inconclusive (see, for instance, Sakakibara and 
Branstetter [2001]; Branstetter, et al. [2006]; and, Lerner [2009]). Many of the difficulties stem 
from the difficulties of identifying appropriate “natural experiments.” Legislation altering 
intellectual property rights is often undertaken in conjunction with other policy reforms or in 
response to shifting economic circumstances. Moreover, empirical studies to date have largely 
focused on the patent regime: given the long lag times between discoveries and commercial 
application in many technical fields, identifying what effects may exist empirically can be 
especially challenging.  
The shorter time lags between the production and dissemination of creative activities and 
software suggest that examining the impacts of copyright law may be more promising. From a 
more practical perspective, the consequences of shifting copyright protection remains intensely 
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partisan, given the intensity of real world controversies about the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act and the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act. 
This paper examines the effect of major but largely unanticipated changes in the allocation 
of copyright protection on venture capital (VC) investment in cloud computing companies. In 
particular, it examines the impact of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision The Cartoon 
Network, et al. v. Cablevision, which was widely perceived as enhancing the property rights of 
cloud computing companies relative to the content owners such as major movie studios and 
publishers, a claim backed by an event study of cloud-computing firms.  Meanwhile, decisions in 
French and German courts took substantially narrower views of these firms’ property rights.  
We focus on the impact of these decisions on VC investment because venture activity is 
well documented, and has been shown to have a positive impact on growth and innovation. Thus, 
while VC represents only a fraction of total investment in this industry, it is a natural setting for 
understanding the impact of policy shifts.  
To understand the impact of copyright protection changes on the willingness of venture 
capitalists to invest in cloud computing, we employ a difference-in-difference approach, 
hypothesizing that policy shifts affect investments in different geographies, sectors, and years in 
varying ways. Such analyses have been widely employed in the economics literature to examine 
the consequences of policy shifts.  
To quantify the impact of copyright protection changes, we first analyze the effects on VC 
investment in cloud computing firms of the Cablevision decision in the U.S., which narrowed the 
protection enjoyed by content creators (e.g., movie studios) and gave greater rights to 
downstream technology firms using this content. We anticipate that the decision eased investors’ 
fears about litigation entangling innovative cloud computing firms, resulting in greater 
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investments. We find that VC investment in cloud computing firms increased significantly in the 
U.S. relative to the EU after the Cablevision decision, particularly in the geographies and sectors 
most affected by the decision. The Cablevision decision, along with court rulings in France and 
Germany, led to additional incremental investment in U.S. cloud computing firms that ranged 
from $728 million to approximately $1.3 billion over the two-and-a-half years after the decision. 
We then examine court rulings in France and Germany, which were perceived as moving in 
the opposite direction. We look at VC investment in cloud computing firms in these countries 
relative to that in other EU nations. We find that these rulings regarding the nature of copyright 
protection had significant negative impacts on investment. Specifically, we find that VC 
investment in cloud computing firms declined in Germany and France, relative to the rest of the 
EU, after the French and German rulings.  
Taken together, our findings suggest that shifts in the allocation of property rights can have 
significant impacts on investment in innovative enterprises. The findings suggest that strong 
upstream intellectual property rights, when combined with seeming large transaction costs that 
deterred licensing, may block investment in innovative downstream technologies. At the same 
time, we must acknowledge that this is a partial equilibrium analysis, which does not allow us to 
assess social welfare. For instance, these decisions may have had different effects on the 
willingness of incumbent firms to invest, as well as the impact on the development of new 
creative works.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 justifies the use of venture 
financing as an indicator, and provides background on the Cablevision decision in the U.S. as 
well as on the French and German court rulings. Section 3 discusses the data used in our 
analyses, Section 4 presents our results from the analysis of the Cablevision decision, and 
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Section 5 presents our results from the analysis of the French and German rulings. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Background 
2.1. Venture Financing as an Indicator 
VC investment is an attractive measurement for several reasons.  
The first rationale related to the practical nature of this measure for researchers. Venture 
financing is well documented, because of the presence of institutional investors who report the 
activities and performance of the funds in which they invest important due to data services such 
as those operated by Dow Jones and Thomson Reuters. Moreover, venture capitalists tend to 
fund young firms in well-defined areas, allowing a detailed mapping of funding by technological 
area. This specificity is in contrast to large corporations, who often report an aggregate R&D or 
those for broad lines of business. 
Second, there is a well-documented relationship between venture capital funding, 
innovation and job growth. Hellmann and Puri [2000] examine a sample of 170 recently formed 
firms in Silicon Valley, including both venture-backed and non-venture-backed firms, and find 
that VC financing is related to more innovative product market strategies and a significant 
reduction in the time taken to bring a product to market. Kortum and Lerner [2000] examine the 
relationship between venture financing and innovation at an aggregate industry level. Exploiting 
the clarification the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the U.S. Department of Labor in 
the late 1970s, a policy shift that freed pensions to invest in venture capital, they show that, even 
after addressing causality concerns, venture funding has a strong positive impact on innovation. 
Puri and Zarutskie [2010] compare the evolution of venture-backed and non-venture-backed 
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firms using the records of the U.S. Census’s Longitudinal Business Database, and find very rapid 
employment growth in venture-financed firms relative to non-venture-financed firms. 
2.2. The U.S. Litigation: The Cartoon Network, et al. v. Cablevision 
Section 4 focuses on a key juncture in copyright policy in the United States: the 2008 
appellate decision in The Cartoon Network, et al. v. Cablevision.3 It will compare VC investment 
in cloud computing in the U.S. against that in the EU (where the decision did not have bearing) 
both before and after the Cablevision decision by employing a differences-in-differences 
approach. 
In 2006, Cablevision announced the development of a Remote Storage Digital Video 
Recorder (RS-DVR). Similar in operation to a traditional recorder, the Cablevision RS-DVRs 
allow customers to record, pause, and replay television content on a hard drive. Unlike 
traditional DVRs, however, in which a consumer installs and uses an appliance in their own 
home, the Cablevision RS-DVR was located remotely, recording to and playing back from 
remote servers. When a consumer hit the “record” button on their remote, the RS-DVR would 
start to record, just as if that RS-DVR were right in their living room. In response, a consortium 
of U.S. television and copyright holders filed a complaint against Cablevision in May 2006 over 
alleged copyright infringement. 
In March 2007, the District Court declared a summary judgment against Cablevision.4 As 
the appellate court subsequently narrated: 
[P]laintiffs successfully argued that Cablevision’s proposed system would directly 
infringe their copyrights in three ways. First, by briefly storing data in the primary 
ingest buffer and other data buffers integral to the function of the RS-DVR, 
                                                 
3  The current suits being brought against DISH by major networks are another important legal matter with respect 
to third-party copyright infringement is; however, we do not analyze the impact of these suits since they have 
yet to be resolved. 
4  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 [S.D.N.Y. 2007]. 
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Cablevision would make copies of protected works and thereby directly infringe 
plaintiffs’ exclusive right of reproduction under the Copyright Act. Second, by 
copying programs onto … hard disks …, Cablevision would again directly 
infringe the reproduction right. And third, by transmitting the data … to … 
customers in response to a “playback” request, Cablevision would directly 
infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive right of public performance.5 
 
This decision attracted relatively little attention from the media and blogs, in large part 
because it was consistent with a series of earlier rulings that restricted the ability of third parties 
to distribute copyrighted material without authorization. For instance, in a 1991 case which 
anticipated many of the issues in the Cablevision case, a district ruled in favor of seven major 
movie companies in a dispute with a firm that developed a system for the electronic delivery of 
movie video tapes.6 Despite the fact that the firm, On Command, had legally purchased the 
videotapes that it transmitted to hotel guests, the court found that the firm’s system infringed the 
studio’s copyrights because it electronically transmitted the movies to hotel rooms (as opposed 
as physically renting the cassettes).  
In August 2008, the District Court decision in Cablevision was reversed on appeal by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.7 The Circuit Court held that Cablevision's RS-DVR system did 
not infringe the plaintiffs’ rights of reproduction and public performance on any of the three 
claimed grounds. The original decision was reversed, vacated, and sent back to be reconsidered 
by the lower court. In June 2009, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case, thereby effectively 
finalizing the Second Circuit’s decision.  
                                                 
5  Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 [2d Cir. 2008]. 
6    On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 777 F. Supp. 787 [N.D. Cal. 1991]. 
7  Cartoon Network, op. cit. 
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Because the Supreme Court never heard the appeal, the decision was only binding to the 
Second Circuit. But the decision was influential nationally, due to the historical sway that the 
circuit as had in copyright cases. As Carter [1991] argues: 
The Second Circuit is widely recognized as the nation's most important copyright 
court. Centered in the capital city of publishing and the arts, and mindful of the 
proud tradition of copyright scholars who have formed its treasure of precedent, 
the court regularly hears appeals raising issues in the forefront of copyright 
developments. The Second Circuit is not shy about its historic leadership role in 
shaping U.S. copyright law. 
 
Moreover, the decision was particularly influential because the Second Circuit has historically 
been seen as sympathetic to copyright owners (as opposed to the 9th Circuit, based in San 
Francisco, which was seen as more sympathetic to firms seeking to exploit copyrighted 
material). The fact that this decision went “against the grain” by limiting the property rights of 
the copyright owners in favor of cloud firms lent it particular importance.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the decision was the first in this area: such decisions are widely understood to have 
significant “persuasive	authority”	in	other	jurisdictions.8	
Consequentially, at the time of the decision, the ruling was perceived as likely to positively 
impact firms focusing on cloud computing. To cite two contemporaneous accounts: 
 The Cablevision ruling is good for IT companies moving into cloud computing, 
said Dow Lohnes PLLC attorney James Burger, who represents technology 
companies in IP and content licensing matters. If the court had found 
Cablevision guilty of direct infringement for giving its customers the RS-DVR 
data storage system, system operators storing consumers’ legally acquired 
entertainment media in the internet cloud could have faced the same claims.9 
 [A] rule holding Cablevision liable merely because it housed and maintained 
the servers in this case could imperil a wide variety of innovative business 
models that rely on the use of remote computing, ranging from examples like 
                                                 
8  This may be partially attributed to a “bandwagon effect,” and partially because reach a different outcome would 
create a “circuit split” that invites Supreme Court review, and thus dramatically increases the odds of a reversal 
of the decision, an outcome most judges try hard to avoid. 
9  Standeford [2009]. 
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Internet-enabled self-service photo processing and printing, to cloud computing 
services offered by companies like Amazon, Apple and Google.10 
Conversations with a number of venture investors suggest that the Cablevision decision led 
to increased VC investment in cloud computing in the U.S. relative to other counties where no 
comparable shift of copyright protection occurred.11 Prior to this decision, venture investors 
feared that record labels, movie studies, and other content owners might sure cloud-computing 
start-ups for copyright infringement, based on their users storing and accessing legally acquired 
copies of protected content. Trade associations such as the Recording Industry Association had 
made substantial investments in ferreting out infringing materials on platforms such as Pirate 
Bay, and the investors feared that the start-ups could readily get caught up in litigation with 
content owners. These concerns were exacerbated by the experience of investors in Napster. The 
firm’s corporate and independent venture investors were sued by major recording companies, 
who argued that the investors were liable for copyright infringement because they had effective 
control of Napster. After the federal courts refused to dismiss the claims, the investors settled the 
case in 2006 and 2007, collectively making what has been estimated to be a nine-figure sum 
[Ottaviani, 2007]. As Ottaviani [2007] noted,  
The decision caused a great deal of discomfort among those firms, in the private 
equity community dealing with content distribution companies. Investors were 
forced to review and rethink commonly used structures to control a portfolio 
company, and evaluate whether and how those control structures exposed the 
investors to liability for copyright infringements of the portfolio company. 
 
It might be thought that these startups could obtain licenses from content providers to immunize 
themselves from such fears, but the transaction costs of such licensing arrangements, our 
                                                 
10  Kwun [2008]. 
11  While there have been several copyright cases against online video recording service providers in Europe, we 
are unaware of any that has resolved such substantial uncertainty with respect to reproduction and 
retransmission rights in favor of such service providers as the Cablevision decision has in the U.S. 
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informants reported, were prohibitive. The costs reflected both the complexity of the rights 
holdings and the suspicion of the intellectual property owners regarding the intentions of 
venture-backed firms. 
Two caveats should be noted. First, it is important to note that to the extent that U.S.-based 
firms also do business in the rest of the world, or EU firms do business in the U.S., such 
international activity will dampen the hypothesized effect since the Internet is affected by both 
local and non-local regulations, and thus any estimates of the hypothesized effect are likely to be 
conservative.  (It should be noted that in many cases foreign courts have deferred to the laws in 
which an Internet company is based when ruling on disputes involving these firms (Chander 
[2012])).  
Second, the Supreme Court addressed similar issues in June 2014,12 when it reversed an 
appellate court decision and concluded that the firm Aereo publicly performs copyrighted works, 
in violation of the Copyright Act, when it sells its subscribers a service that allows them to watch 
television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over 
the air. This decision was seen as reintroducing substantial uncertainty into the breadth of 
copyright protection [Stoltz, 2014]. 
2.3. The French Litigation: M6, W9, France Television, TF1, and NT1 v. Wizzgo (2008) 
In Section 5, we will also examine the impact of decisions in the French and German courts 
relative to those elsewhere in Europe. In May 2008, Wizzgo launched the first online DVR 
platform in France, which allowed users to view recorded copies of programs broadcast on 
domestic terrestrial television channels as long as they requested that the show be recorded 
                                                 
12    American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). 
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before the programs started.13 The copy was a faithful reproduction and included the original 
advertising.14 In response, a consortium of French television and copyright holders, including 
M6, W9, France Television, TF1, and NT1, filed complaints against Wizzgo over alleged 
copyright infringement. 
Wizzgo argued that its technological platform fell under two exceptions in French 
copyright law: transience and privacy copying. First, Wizzgo claimed that it provided users with 
a temporary and transient copy of a program, and only assisted users in saving private copies. 
Second, Wizzgo claimed that each copy of a recorded program was private. In France, copying 
copyrighted work strictly for personal use falls under the private copy exception as long as the 
copyist and the user of the copy are the same person.15 Throughout August and November 2008, 
the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris issued a series of injunctions, banning Wizzgo from 
using the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.16 On November 25, 2008, the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris declared the final set of summary judgments against Wizzgo and levied a 
fine.17 In response to the court’s ruling and the fine ordered by the court, Wizzgo and similar 
companies halted operations.18 Outside sources suggest that the French litigation is likely to have 
a negative impact on VC investment and to delay the development of related technology, such as 
cloud computing services. For example, a paper by European Digital Rights states that “[t]he 
[Wizzgo] case is a relevant example to further corroborate the idea that the current EU copyright 
                                                 
13  International Law Office [February 19, 2009]. 
14  Wizzgo [2009]. 
15  International Law Office [February 19, 2009]. 
16  The Tribunal de Grande Instance issued five summary judgments against Wizzgo: (1) Metropole Television v. 
Wizzgo [August 6, 2008]; (2) France 2 v. Wizzgo [November 6, 2008]; (3) TF1 v. Wizzgo [November 6, 2008]; 
(4) NT1 v. Wizzgo [November 10, 2008]; and (5) Metropole Television v. Wizzgo [November 25, 2008]. 
International Law Office [February 19, 2009]; and ZDNet.fr [November 14, 2008]. 
17  International Law Office [February 19, 2009]. 
18  “The court ordered compensatory damages of more than €440,000 against Wizzgo for copyright infringement, 
which convinced other French online DVR platforms immediately to cease similar services.” (International Law 
Office [February 19, 2009]). 
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policy hinders technology.”19 Some members of the popular press was similarly disappointed; 
for example, one member wrote that “[b]y closing the door to the Wizzgo arguments […] and the 
evolution of technology and uses, the French justice system is particularly reactionary and 
conservative.”20 Given the view that the French ruling was likely to have a negative impact on 
related technologies, it is logical to hypothesize that this ruling would lead to decreased VC 
investment in cloud computing in France relative to other counties in the EU. 
2.4. The German Litigation: RTL et al. v. Shift.tv and Save.tv 
Shift.tv, founded in 2005, and Save.tv, founded in 2006, are subscription-based services 
that allow customers to select and store television content on servers from which users can 
download and stream stored programs.21 Online video recording platform service providers 
operate sites that facilitate the receipt of TV signals through satellite reception stations, and 
transform and store these signals in customer-dedicated server space.22 Customers select the 
content to be stored and can download and/or stream the content. In response to the services 
offered by these companies, two German television channels, RTL and SAT1, began judicial 
action claiming that the services constituted copyright infringement.23 
A German District Court found that both Shift.tv and Save.tv infringed plaintiffs’ 
reproductions rights by storing and copying the data streams provided by the plaintiffs on servers 
for playback by customers, on May 12, 2006 and May 9, 2007, respectively. The Dresden Court 
of Appeals ruled against Shift.tv on November 28, 2006, yet in favor of Save.tv on October 9, 
                                                 
19  European Digital Rights [2011]. 
20  “En claquant ainsi la porte à l'argumentaire de Wizzgo […] et l'évolution des technologies et des usages, la 
justice française se montre particulièrement rétrograde et conservatrice.” (Caruana [2008]). 
21  Poschenrieder [2008]; and International Law Office [June 11, 2009]. 
22  Bird and Bird [2009]. 
23  Three lawsuits: SAT1 v. Shift.tv; RTL v. Shift.tv; and RTL v. Save.tv. (See IRIS Legal Observations of the 
European Audiovisual Observatory [2011]). 
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2007.24 On April 22, 2009, the Federal Court of Justice repealed both rulings and remanded them 
to the Dresden Appeals Court.25 In doing so, the Federal Court of Justice considered the 
recording process and ruled on two issues: the right of reproduction and the right of 
retransmission. To the court, it was unclear whether Shift.tv and Save.tv recorded broadcasts on 
behalf of its users, or if the technology was automatic and users themselves recorded the 
programs. If the copying was not automatic, the Federal Court ruled that Shift.tv and Save.tv 
would be liable for direct infringement of reproduction rights. Even if the copying was fully 
automatic, the defendants could be liable for infringement of the plaintiffs’ retransmission rights 
to the public, which are harmed by retransmitting broadcasting signals simultaneously to a large 
number of customers.26 Thus, the Federal Court instructed the Appeals Court, on a case-by-case 
basis, to rule on whether the reproduction process is automated and to clarify the extent to which 
the plaintiffs infringed retransmission rights.27 
In July 2011, the Dresden Appeals Court ruled in favor of Save.tv and found that its online 
video recorder did not infringe RTL’s rights of reproduction, though a similar ruling has not been 
reached for Shift.tv. The court found that from a technical standpoint, the user initiates an 
automated recording process to create a private copy of a television program.28 However, the 
court did not resolve the issue of retransmission rights infringement.29 As such, Save.tv requires 
a license for retransmission from RTL, yet it has been unable to do obtain such a license.30 Thus, 
                                                 
24  Burghart [2010]; International Law Office [June 11, 2009]; IRIS Legal Observations of the European 
Audiovisual Observatory [2011]; and “OLG Dresden 14 U 801/07 Urteil vom 12.07.2011.” 
25  International Law Office [2009]; and IRIS Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory 
[2011]. 
26  Burghart [2010]; and, Bird and Bird [2009]. 
27  IRIS Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory [2011]. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid. 
30  VG Media, the German royalty collecting society, refused to grant Save.tv the necessary licenses to operate its 
business, arguing that online video licenses are not covered by its agreement with German broadcasters. (See 
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while Save.tv was not found liable of direct infringement, German law has blurred the issue by 
neither ruling completely in favor nor completely against companies like Save.tv and Shift.tv. 
While Save.tv does not infringe reproduction rights, the German courts have ruled that television 
channels can prevent these businesses from operating by refusing to issue licenses for 
retransmission. 
While both Save.tv and Shift.tv continue to operate in Germany, outside sources suggest 
that the German litigation—by raising questions about the allocation of copyright protection—is 
likely to have a negative impact on investment in this and related technologies, such as cloud 
computing services. For example, “[a]lthough the Federal Court of Justice referred the case back 
to the Court of Appeal, it is already clear that the business model of Internet-based video 
recording can be operated legally only with the broadcasters’ prior permission. It is doubtful 
whether a service operated on this basis can be profitable.”31 The popular press also reacted 
negatively: “[N]ew technology and innovation are impeded by [the 2009 judgment], which 
unnecessarily increases the technical deficits of Germany compared to other Internet-nations.”32 
As with the French ruling, given the view that the German rulings were likely to have a negative 
impact on related technologies, it is logical to hypothesize that these rulings would lead to 
decreased VC investment in cloud computing in Germany relative to other counties in the EU. 
                                                                                                                                                             
IRIS Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory [2011]). In a November 2010 ruling on the 
dispute, the Appeals Court of Munchen found that “RTL is entitled to prohibit Save.tv from retransmitting its 
programmes.” (See IRIS Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory [2011]). 
31  International Law Office [June 11, 2009]. 
32  “Moderner Technik und Innovation wird damit seiner Ansicht nach ein Riegel vorgeschoben, der die 
technischen Defizite Deutschland gegenüber anderer Internet-Nationen nur unnötig steigert. Mit dem neusten 
Urteil hingegen sei endlich ein Startschuss für weitere Entwicklungen gefallen.” (See TVAnbieter.de [July 25, 
2011].) 
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2.5. Event Study Evidence 
One way to validate the impact of these judicial decisions on cloud companies is to 
examine the consequences of these decisions on publicly traded cloud-computing companies in 
the same country. Inasmuch as the decisions contained unexpected good or bad news, it should 
affect their valuation either positively or negatively.  
To undertake such an analysis, we sought to identify publicly traded cloud computing 
companies. We identified potential cloud computing firms through Capital IQ, the CloudTimes 
“50 Top” [2010] list, IDC analyst reports, and Thomson Reuters VentureXpert. We verified from 
CRSP and/or Datastream that the firm was publicly traded at the time of the decisions, and from 
securities filings that the firm was active in the cloud computing market at that time. The sample 
included companies with active cloud-computing divisions but generated the bulk of their 
revenues in other ways (e.g., Amazon) and dedicated cloud-computing firms (e.g., Rackspace).  
It proved to be much more straightforward to undertake this analysis in the United States 
than in France and Germany. In the United States, we were able to identify 25 companies that 
met our criteria. In Europe, it was much more difficult. For instance, in Germany, following the 
same procedure, we could identify only two borderline cases, Deutsche Telekom and SAP, 
which were problematic as they appeared to really get involved in cloud computing at a 
considerably later date. This paucity of identified firms may reflect the relative thinness of 
technology activity in continental Europe in this area, the difficulties that many entrepreneurial 
European face in going public, and the poorer representation of technology analysts and reporters 
on the continent.  
As a result, we focused our analysis on the U.S. judicial decisions.  Because of some 
uncertainty of the timing during the day of the release of the decisions, we looked at the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the day of the decision and the day after (the [0, +1] 
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window). Because the “pure play” cloud companies were generally smaller in market 
capitalization, we focused on equal-weighted returns. For the market-adjusted model, we use a 
one-year estimation period, ending two months before the event. 
Table 1 illustrates the key patterns. The March 2007 District Court decision was 
associated with negative returns, which was weakly significant in one specification. These results 
were consistent with press accounts that suggested that this decision largely corroborated the 
received wisdom about the nature of copyright protection, and thus contained limited news. The 
August 2008 Second Circuit decision, on the other hand, had a substantial positive effect. Not 
only was the absolute magnitude of the effect stronger (a positive CAR of +1.2% and 1.4%), but 
the four tests are consistently significant at the 5% confidence level, and in three cases at the 1% 
level. 
3. Data 
3.1. Venture Capital Funding Data 
In order to examine the differences in how VC investment in cloud companies varies 
between the U.S. and EU, and between France and Germany and other EU countries, we 
constructed a dataset that draws on historical investment figures captured by VentureXpert.33 
VentureXpert is one of the two most widely-used databases of VC investments in the U.S. and 
EU.34 It contains data on approximately 1.2 million global private companies and over 25,000 
venture, buyout, and mezzanine funds.35 
                                                 
33  More specifically, the Thomson ONE’s Private Equity module powered by VentureXpert was used.   
34  Maats et al. [2009]. 
35  Thomson Reuters factsheet [2011]. 
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The dataset uses all private equity investments in the Thomson database from the beginning 
of 1995 through the end of 2010 classified as “Venture Capital Deals”36 involving a portfolio 
company with a business description including the term “cloud.” These criteria yielded data on 
investments in 280 companies. Independent research identified an additional 216 cloud 
computing-related companies,37 59 of which received VC investment from 1995 through 2010 
captured in VentureXpert. Seventy-nine companies were removed from the list of 339 (280 + 59) 
companies appearing in VentureXpert based upon review of their business descriptions, and 17 
were removed for lack of any data on investment amount.38 As a result, the final dataset contains 
data on VC investments in 243 cloud computing companies.39 
The unit of observation in the data extracted from VentureXpert is an investment by a 
particular VC fund into a particular portfolio company on a particular date. The dataset contains 
2,009 observations on investments by 706 distinct funds into the 243 companies on 587 different 
dates. These data were then aggregated by calendar quarter of investment date by region (U.S., 
EU, and the rest of the world for the analysis of the Cablevision decision, and France, Germany, 
EU, and the rest of Europe for the analysis of the French and German rulings).  
                                                 
36  Venture capital investments include start-up, seed, and early, expansion, and later stage deals. 
37  This researched involved the review of numerous sources, including: Corbin [2011]; “The Top 20 Software as a 
Service (SaaS) Vendors,” http://www.clouds360.com/saas.php; “The Top 20 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
Vendors,” http://www.clouds360.com/iaas.php; “The Top 20 Platform as a Service (PaaS) Vendors,” 
http://www.clouds360.com/paas.php; Kirilov [2011]; Geelan [2009]; “50 Top Cloud Computing Companies,” 
http://www.cloudtweaks.com/2010/07/over-50-of-the-biggest-and-best-cloud-computing-companies, [2010]; 
Depena [2011]; Singh [2009]; and, “List of Top ‘Cloud Computing Solution Providers to Watch in 2009,” 
http://www.oncloudcomputing.com/en/2009/07/list-of-top-cloud-computing-solution-providers-to-watch-in-
2009/, [2009]. 
38  Business descriptions from VentureXpert, Bloomberg, the company websites, and news stories were reviewed. 
Companies were excluded if cloud computing did not appear to be a primary part of their business or their 
business appeared to focus on pushing non-user-generated content to from the cloud to users (e.g., security 
updates, games, licensed media content). 
39  In identifying cloud computing companies for our analysis, we carefully reviewed all business descriptions as 
well as, when possible, company websites to ensure that the company was primarily a cloud computing 
company and that the company’s business was one that had the potential to be affected by the rulings in France, 
Germany, and the U.S.  
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Appendix A summarizes the data used in the analysis of the Cablevision decision. As it 
shows, total VC investment in the identified U.S. cloud companies from the first quarter of 1995 
to the end of 2010 amounted to $5.9 billion. This reflects average quarterly investment of $92.3 
million over that time period. In the period immediately preceding the Cablevision ruling (Q1 
2006 to Q2 2008), average quarterly investment in U.S. venture-backed cloud companies was 
$131.0 million, and subsequent to the ruling, that figure amounted to $184.7 million. Thus, 
average quarterly investment in U.S. cloud computing increased by approximately 41 percent 
after the Cablevision decision. Appendix A further shows that VC investment in the identified 
EU cloud companies from the first quarter of 1995 to the end of 2010 amounted to $242.3 
million. This reflects average quarterly investment of $3.8 million over that time period. In the 
period immediately preceding the Cablevision ruling (Q1 2006 to Q2 2008), the average 
quarterly investment in EU venture-backed cloud companies was $7.0 million, and subsequent to 
the ruling, that figure amounted to $8.9 million. Thus, average quarterly investment in EU cloud 
computing increased by approximately 27 percent, as compared with 41 percent in the U.S., after 
the Cablevision decision. 
Appendix B summarizes the data used in the analysis of the French rulings for three time 
periods: (1) the entire period for which data from VentureXpert were obtained (Q1 1995 to Q4 
2010), (2) a short period preceding the Wizzgo ruling (Q1 2006 to Q4 2008), and (3) a short 
period following the ruling (Q1 2009 to Q4 2010). We focus on relatively short periods around 
the ruling to mitigate the bias that could be introduced from long-term investment trends prior to 
2006. 
In the period immediately preceding the Wizzgo ruling, there were no VC investments in 
French venture-backed cloud companies, and subsequent to the ruling, the average quarterly VC 
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investment in French cloud companies was $0.45 million. In the EU as a whole,40 for the period 
immediately preceding the Wizzgo ruling, the average quarterly VC investment in cloud 
companies was $5.9 million. Subsequent to the ruling, the average quarterly VC investment in 
EU cloud companies was $9.8 million.  
Appendix C summarizes the data used in the analysis of the German rulings for four time 
periods: (1) the entire period for which data from VentureXpert were obtained (Q1 1995 to Q4 
2010), (2) a short period preceding the 2006 German District Court ruling (Q1 2004 to Q2 2006), 
(3) a short period following the ruling (Q3 2006 to Q4 2008), and (4) a longer period following 
the ruling (Q3 2006 to Q4 2010). As with the French ruling, we focus on relatively a short period 
around the 2006 German District Court ruling (Q1 2004 to Q4 2008) to isolate the effect of this 
ruling as well as the other similar rulings discussed above that occurred in 2006 and 2007. We 
also investigate the effect over a longer time period (Q1 2004 to Q4 2010) since the litigation 
involving Shift.tv and Safe.tv, to our knowledge, has not yet been completely resolved. Thus, 
uncertainty likely exists regarding the viability of certain cloud computing business models in 
Germany. 
In the period immediately preceding the 2006 German District Court ruling (Q1 2004 to Q2 
2006), there were no investments in German venture-backed cloud companies, while the average 
quarterly VC investment in EU cloud companies was $3.5 million. Subsequent to the ruling, for 
the shorter period Q3 2006 to Q4 2008, there were also no investments in German venture-
backed cloud companies, while EU cloud computing companies received average quarterly VC 
investment of $6.9 million. For the longer period Q3 2006 to Q4 2010, the average quarterly VC 
                                                 
40  All other EU countries during the period under study were included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. 
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investment in German cloud companies was $0.30 million, while EU cloud computing 
companies received average quarterly VC investment of $8.2 million.  
3.2. Supplemental Data 
We augment the VC funding data with data on other factors that could influence investors’ 
decisions to invest in cloud computing specifically, and in other sectors more generally. Such 
factors include macroeconomic conditions reflected in gross domestic product (GDP) measures 
and the feasibility of cloud computing as measured by broadband penetration. 
Our GDP data are quarterly growth rates of real, seasonally adjusted GDP as a percent 
change over the previous quarter from the OECD.41 These data are available for the U.S. from 
Q1 1995 through Q2 2011, and for the EU (27 countries), including France and Germany, from 
Q2 1995 through Q2 2011. 
Data on broadband penetration, which is equal to the number of broadband subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants, was obtained from the OECD for the U.S. and 21 of the 27 EU member 
states from Q2 2002 through Q4 2010.42 To calculate an EU-specific measure of broadband 
penetration in each period, the broadband penetration rate of each EU member state was 
multiplied by its corresponding annual population to obtain the number of broadband 
subscribers. Next, the total number of EU broadband subscribers was obtained by summing over 
all EU member states; this total was then divided by the total EU population to obtain an EU-
specific measure of broadband penetration. Finally, quarterly broadband penetration rates were 
calculated by linearly interpolating the semi-annual series. 
                                                 
41  Data accessed through http://stats.oecd.org. 
42  Data accessed through http://stats.oecd.org. 
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These supplemental data are summarized in Appendix A for the U.S., Appendix B for 
France, and Appendix C for Germany. 
4. Estimation and Results – The Cablevision Decision  
We first examine whether investment in venture-backed U.S. cloud companies shifted 
subsequent to the Q3 2008 Cablevision appeals court ruling. Each of these analyses are variants 
of difference-in-difference regression frameworks that rely on historical VC investment in both 
the U.S. and EU as controls in order to identify any statistically significant increase in VC 
investment in U.S. cloud companies post-Cablevision.   
Our initial set of regression analyses are variants of the following regression model that 
accounts for the impact of a variety of factors on quarterly venture-backed investment in the 
identified cloud companies: 
VC Ratior,t = β0 + β1(U.S. Indicator)r + β2(Q3 2008 or After Dummy)t + β3(Effect of 
Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment)r,t +θXr,t+ εr,t. (1)  
Specifically, the dependent variable, VC Ratior,t, is VC dollars invested in the cloud 
computing companies in region r at quarter t divided by VC dollars invested in all information 
technology (IT) companies (including cloud computing) in region r at quarter t. We normalized 
our dependent variable this way because the volume of VC activity varies considerably over time 
due to factors that are largely exogenous to the issues being studied here. To cite one notable 
example, the volume of venture investment fell by almost 90 percent between 2000 and 2002; 
this decline was driven primarily by the collapse in the public valuations for internet and 
telecommunications stocks in 2000, and the subsequent inability of venture funds to exit many of 
their investments at attractive prices. In other cases, funds have flowed to particular sectors, such 
as cleantech, potentially crowding out investment elsewhere.  
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As a result, the bulk of our analyses examine VC investments in cloud computing as a 
share of all VC investments, though we also analyze the level of venture investment in cloud 
computing in a robustness check. When we replicate the results using the level of financing, we 
find the results go through as before.  
The explanatory variable U.S. Indicator equals one for investment in U.S. cloud computing 
companies and zero for investment in EU cloud computing companies. The explanatory variable 
Q3 2008 or After Dummy equals zero for all quarters before the U.S. Appellate Court decision in 
the Cablevision case in August 2008 and one in Q3 2008 and all quarters thereafter. The 
explanatory variable, Effect of the Cablevision Decision on U.S. VC Investment, a dummy 
variable capturing the interaction between the U.S. Indicator and the Q3 2008 Dummy, equals 
one for investment in U.S. cloud computing companies in Q3 2008 and thereafter, and zero 
otherwise. Xr,t is a vector of other explanatory variables, including GDP growth and broadband 
penetration, that may be associated with investment in cloud companies. 
This difference-in-difference model is designed to estimate parameter β3, whether 
investment in venture-backed U.S. cloud companies rose subsequent to the Cablevision decision, 
controlling for trends in the U.S. relative to EU (captured by U.S. Indicator), and trends in cloud 
computing generally (captured by Q3 2008 or After Dummy) absent the policy. 
In order to focus more narrowly on the time period surrounding the Cablevision decision, 
our analyses focus on investment levels from 2006 to 2010. Doing so eliminates long-term 
investment trends prior to 2006 from influencing the results. Figure 1, which depicts the 
quarterly difference between investment in U.S. and EU venture-backed firms, suggests that 
investment in U.S. venture-backed cloud companies was not systematically increasing, relative 
to EU firms, in the time period immediately preceding the 2008 Cablevision ruling; however, 
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investment in U.S. venture-backed cloud companies increased, relative to EU firms, after the 
2008 Cablevision ruling.43 
 Our first set of regression results are presented below in Table 2, and show that 
investment in venture-backed cloud computing companies is significantly higher in the U.S. than 
in the EU after the Cablevision decision.44 The coefficient on β3 in Model 1, which provides an 
estimate of the change in VC investment post-Cablevision, is equal to 0.0257. It indicates that 
the rise in average VC investment in cloud computing in the U.S. as a percentage of VC 
investment in IT in the U.S. from the period Q1 2006 through Q2 2008 to the period Q3 2008 
through Q4 2010 was approximately 2.57 percent greater than the corresponding rise in cloud 
computing investment in the EU, or approximately 3.16 percent overall.45 This estimate of β3, 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, implies an approximately $730 million 
increased VC investment in U.S. cloud computing companies after the Cablevision decision. 
Model 2 is similar to Model 1, except that it incorporates variables that control for GDP 
growth and broadband penetration. As shown in column 2 of Table 2, the coefficients on these 
                                                 
43  Figure 1 shows that the increase in VC investment in the U.S., relative to the EU, did not occur immediately 
after the 2008 Cablevision ruling. Such a delay is consistent with both the typical amount of time required to 
obtain VC investment and the fact that VC investment often involves multiple rounds of increasing size. 
Specifically, the VC investment process typically takes between 6 and 12 months (Madison Park Group [2008]) 
and a firm receiving VC investment may receive multiple rounds, with the average investment size in the first 
round equal to between $6 and $13 million, the average in the second round equal to between $8 and $15 
million, and the average in later-stage rounds equal to between $15 and $23 million (Huggett [2012]). In 
addition, there are gaps between each round, with the average time between rounds of financing in 2010 equal 
to approximately 20 months (Sherman [2012]). 
44  Around the time of the Cablevision decision, some cloud services were launched, such as Microsoft Windows 
Azure on November 17, 2009 (“Microsoft Cloud Services Vision Becomes Reality With Launch of Windows 
Azure Platform,” http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2009/nov09/11-17pdc1pr.aspx), and these 
services may have had an effect on VC investment in cloud computing in the U.S. However, other cloud 
services, such as Amazon EC2 and Google Apps and Docs were launched much earlier in 2006, and appeared to 
have little or no effect on VC investment in the U.S. (“Google Introduces New Business Version of Popular 
Hosted Applications,” http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2007/02/google-introduces-new-business-
version_22.html; http://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2006/; and, “Google Announces Google Docs 
& Spreadsheets,” http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2006/10/google-announces-google-docs_11.html.) 
Furthermore, any cloud services that were launched around the time of the Cablevision decision may have been 
in part launched because of the clarity afforded by the decision. 
45  β2 + β3 = 0.0059 + 0.0257 = 0.0316.  
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variables have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant. Interpretation of the 
other variables remains the same, and as shown in the table, the magnitude and significance of 
the Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment is almost identical to the magnitude and 
significance of the Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment in Model 1. The implied increase 
in U.S. VC investment of approximately $728 million is nearly identical as well. 
To investigate the potential impact of outliers on our analysis, we ran Models 1 and 2 using 
a difference-in-difference quantile regression analysis. Quantile regression analysis allows one to 
estimate the relationship between a set of independent variables and a specific quantile, or 
percentile, of the response variable. One advantage of such an analysis is that the influence of 
large outliers is mitigated. Thus, for our context, it allows us to determine the extent to which our 
results are sensitive to quarters with very large or very small values of the dependent variable, 
VC Ratio. Results for median (quantile) difference-in-difference regressions are presented in 
Table 3.  
Results for Model 3, the quantile regression version of Model 1, are presented in Table 3. 
These results are similar to those presented in Table 2 and imply that the rise in median (as 
opposed to average) VC investment in cloud computing in the U.S., as a percentage of VC 
investment in IT in the U.S. from the period Q1 2006 through Q2 2008 to the period Q3 2008 
through Q4 2010, was approximately 3.5 percent greater than the corresponding rise in cloud 
computing investment in the EU. This estimate, which is statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level, implies an approximately $952 million increase in VC investment in U.S. cloud 
computing companies after the Cablevision decision. 
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Results for Model 4, the quantile regression version of Model 2, are also presented in Table 
3, and are similar to those for Model 3 with an implied increase in U.S. cloud computing 
investment of approximately $904 million.  
4.1. Additional Sensitivity Analyses and Robustness Checks 
4.1.1. Alternative Control Group Specifications 
We have also estimated a difference-in-difference model comparing investment in the U.S. 
to investment in the rest of the world (ROW) in order to examine whether the results are 
sensitive to the use of EU companies as a control group. Specifically, we have conducted 
analyses analogous to Model 1 using ROW investment (rather than investment in the EU) as a 
benchmark.  
As an alternative approach to examining the robustness of our findings, we have examined 
the extent to which investment levels increased subsequent to the Cablevision ruling for a broad 
set of internet companies, rather than just the cloud companies included in the above analyses. 
We anticipate that there will be no effects for this set of internet companies since the Cablevision 
ruling should only affect cloud computing companies. The results associated with Models 5 and 
6 presented in Table 4, are analogous to Models 1 and 2 except that they are run on the “internet-
specific” companies rather than the cloud companies.46 
 As the results in Table 4 show, investment levels in U.S. internet-specific companies 
either actually decrease in the U.S. following the Cablevision decision (Model 5), or are not 
statistically different in the time periods before and after the Cablevision ruling (Model 6). This 
suggests that the findings described above are specific to cloud companies, in particular, and do 
                                                 
46   VentureXpert categorized 8,510 companies as being internet-specific. This list includes companies described as 
“internet communications,” “e-commerce technology,” “computer hardware,” “internet software,” “internet 
programming,” “internet ecommerce,” “internet content,” and “internet services.” 
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not reflect general trends associated with venture-backed investment in internet-specific 
companies.47 
4.1.2. Stationarity48 
One assumption made in our regression analyses is that the data are stationary; that is that 
the data series do not depend on time and thus, that the mean, variance, and covariance of the 
data do not vary with time. To examine the extent to which increased U.S. investment 
subsequent to the Cablevision decision reflects an ongoing trend, perhaps attributable to factors 
not reflected in any of the data we collected, we have conducted a variety of tests. First, we ran a 
simple ordinary least squares regression on the difference between U.S. and EU investment 
levels against a time trend; this revealed that U.S. investment levels relative to EU investment 
levels were falling on average, but not significantly, during the Q1 2006 to Q3 2008 time period. 
To more formally test for stationarity in our time series data, we conducted three well-
known tests on our data from Q1 2006 through Q4 2010: the Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin tests. Using each test, we found no evidence of non-
stationarity. As such, our data appear to be stationary, and thus, it is not necessary to adjust our 
regression equations or data. 
4.1.3. Autocorrelation 
We also tested for the presence of autocorrelation in our regression analyses by conducting 
a test proposed by Jeffrey Wooldridge for panel data.49 After correcting for autocorrelation, the 
                                                 
47   We also undertake a variety of unreported robustness checks. These include using the logarithm of venture 
financing as a dependent variable, as more detailed controls for country and industry. The results are robust to 
these alterations. 
48  A stationary time series is one whose statistical properties such as mean, variance, and autocorrelation, are all 
constant over time. Most statistical methods are based on this assumption, and violations of stationarity can lead 
to biased point estimates. 
49  Wooldridge [2002]. 
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estimate of the effect of Cablevision remains significant and positive, and the implied increase 
in U.S. cloud VC investment actually increases from that of Models 1 and 2. 
4.1.4. Clustered Standard Errors 
Clustering standard errors corrects for the lack of independence between observations. In 
our data, observations within a quarter may contain similar information. Without correcting for 
the non-independence of the data, the standard errors would potentially be too small, and thus the 
p-values would be too low. To correct for this, we clustered our standard errors by quarter. 
Although the p-values increase as expected, the estimate of the effect of Cablevision remains 
significant. Specifically, as Table 5 shows, the estimate of the effect of Cablevision remains 
significant in both Models 7 and 8 these models are analogs to Models 1 and 2, with the only 
difference being that the standard errors are clustered by quarter. 
4.1.5. Tobit Regression Model 
 Given the fact that many of the observations in our dependent variable are equal to zero 
(32.8 percent), we run a Tobit model in an unreported analyses to account for potential 
censoring. Doing so, we find that the estimate of the effect of Cablevision remains significant 
and positive in Models 1 and 2. When Model 1 is run using ordinary least squares, we find that 
the coefficient on the effect of Cablevision is equal to 0.0257 and is significant at the five percent 
level. When we instead use a Tobit model, the coefficient on the effect of Cablevision is equal to 
0.0241 and is significant at the ten percent level. When we rerun Model 2 using a Tobit model, 
the estimate of the effect of Cablevision decision also remains significant. 
4.1.6. Investment Levels (vs. Ratios) 
We ran additional sensitivities based on an alternate specification of the dependent 
variable. Specifically, we ran regressions analogous to Models 1 and 2 but where the dependent 
   
27 
 
variable was the total quarterly investment (in the U.S. or EU) measured in dollars, rather than 
measured in terms of a ratio relative to total IT spending. The total other IT VC investment and 
total other VC investment in a given region were controlled for by their inclusion as separate 
independent variables in the regression analysis. These regressions yielded results, presented in 
Table 6, comparable to those of Models 1 and 2. 
In Model 9, the analog to Model 1, U.S. investment was, on average, $119 million higher 
each quarter after the Cablevision ruling (after controlling for EU differences), totaling $1.2 
billion over the 2.5 subsequent years. The corresponding figures for Model 10 the Model 2 
analog, which incorporates controls for GDP changes and broadband penetration, imply $126 
million higher investment on a quarterly basis and $1.3 billion in total for the 2.5 years.  
4.1.7. Investment Events (vs. Investment Ratios or Investment Levels) 
We next ran regressions analogous to Models 1 and 2 where the dependent variable was 
whether a given VC deal was a cloud deal or not, rather than total quarterly investment measured 
in dollars or the ratio of total quarterly investment relative to total IT spending. In running these 
regressions, we used a logit model where, if a deal was a cloud deal, the binary dependent 
variable was set equal to one; otherwise, the dependent variable was set equal to zero. Because 
there is a strong industry effect in venture funding—some groups specialize, for instance, in 
biotechnology, while others concentrate on energy--we restricted our sample to include only VC 
firms that had previously provided funding to a cloud company. Our results, which are presented 
in Table 7, indicate that the effect of Cablevision on whether a VC firm provided financing to a 
cloud company is generally positive and significant, and suggest that our principal results are not 
being driven by a small number of large VC investments.  
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4.1.8. Investment Rounds (vs. Investment Ratios or Investment Levels) 
We also ran regressions analogous to Models 1 and 2 where the dependent variable was the 
number of rounds of VC investment received within a given quarter (in the U.S. or EU), rather 
than total quarterly investment measured in dollars or the ratio of total quarterly investment 
relative to total IT spending. Our results, which are shown below in Table 8, indicate that the 
effect of Cablevision on the number of U.S. VC investment rounds is positive and significant, 
and suggest that our principal results are not being driven by a small number of large VC 
investments. These results thus provide further evidence that decisions around copyright 
protection can have significant impacts on VC investment. 
4.1.9. Cloud Company Identification 
We have also tested the sensitivity of our results to the list of cloud computing companies 
included in our dataset. Our results are robust to the use of a smaller set of companies, that is, 
one that includes those with “cloud” in their VentureXpert business descriptions but does not 
include additions based on review of third party cloud computing company lists. 
Our research also revealed specific types of cloud companies that are likely to be 
differentially affected by the Cablevision decision. In particular, there exist three general types of 
cloud computing services: infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), software-as-a-service (SaaS), and 
platform-as-a-service (PaaS). IaaS providers are the most likely to be affected by the Cablevision 
decision because their customers can store files, some of which may be copyrighted, on their 
servers. SaaS providers, in contrast, are the least likely to be affected by the Cablevision decision 
because they generally provide pre-packaged software solutions that are unlikely to be tasked 
with storing copyrighted materials on the providers’ servers. And finally, PaaS providers form a 
middle ground between IaaS and SaaS providers in which the consumer, rather than the provider, 
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creates the software using tools and/or libraries from the provider. Some customers may create 
services that store or access copyrighted material, while others may not; thus, it is unclear 
whether PaaS services are likely to be affected by the Cablevision decision. 
Table 9 provides results from three regressions where we investigate the differential impact 
of the Cablevision decision on VC investment in IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS companies. In Model 18, 
we run a regression in which only VC investment in IaaS companies is included in the 
denominator of our dependent variable, and we find results consistent with our hypothesis 
articulated above; that is, we find a significant and positive impact of the Cablevision decision on 
VC investment in IaaS companies. Model 19, which estimates the impact of the Cablevision 
decision on PaaS companies, also finds a significant and positive impact of the Cablevision 
decision. And finally Model 20, which estimates the impact of the Cablevision decision on VC 
investment in SaaS companies, provides results that are consistent with our expectation that SaaS 
companies should be unaffected; that is, we find an insignificant, although positive impact of the 
Cablevision decision on VC investment in SaaS companies. Thus, we find that those cloud 
companies that are the most likely to be affected by the Cablevision decision experience an 
increase in VC investment in the U.S. relative to the EU after the decision.  
4.1.10. Second Circuit Court Analysis 
We ran additional regressions using a logit model, similar to Models 11, 12, and 13 in 
Table 7, to determine whether investment in cloud companies headquartered in states under the 
jurisdiction of the Second Circuit Court increased compared to the rest of the U.S. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the states of New York, Connecticut, and 
Vermont; since the Second Circuit Court sets binding precedent for district courts in these states, 
we expect to see an even bigger increase in investment in cloud companies located in these states 
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after the Cablevision decision. While this decision, as discussed above, was likely to have a 
broader impact, the effect of the decision should be most substantial here. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this ruling has indeed effected firms’ location decisions. 
For instance, high-profile (and controversial) video streaming company Aereo chose to locate in 
New York with a “model engineered specifically to take advantage of 2008 ruling from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a copyright case against Cablevision” (Bario [2013]). 
Our results, presented in Table 10, support our hypothesis. We find a positive and 
significant impact of the Cablevision decision on investment in cloud companies in states under 
the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction in Models 21, 22, and 23. 
5. Estimation and Results – The French and German Rulings 
To determine whether investment in venture-backed French and German cloud companies 
declined subsequent to the Wizzgo and 2006 German District Court rulings, we ran regressions 
similar to those that were run to analyze the impact of the Cablevision decision. For France: 
VC Ratior,t = β0 + β1(France Indicator)r + β2(Q1 2009 or After Dummy)t + β3(Effect of 
Wizzgo Decision on French VC Investment)r,t + θXr,t+ εr,t. (1)  
And for Germany: 
VC Ratior,t = β0 + β1(Germany Indicator)r + β2(Q3 2006 or After Dummy)t + β3(Effect of 
German Decisions on German VC Investment)r,t + θXr,t+ εr,t. (2)  
The dependent variable, VC Ratior,t, is VC dollars invested in the cloud computing companies in 
region r at quarter t divided by VC dollars invested in information technology (IT) companies in 
region r at quarter t, computed for both the country in question and the rest of the EU excluding 
France and Germany. 
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The explanatory variable France Indicator (Germany Indicator) equals one for investment 
in French (German) cloud computing companies and zero for investment in German (France) 
and EU cloud computing companies. The explanatory variable Q1 2009 or After Dummy (Q3 
2006 or After Dummy) equal zero for all quarters before the French (German) Court ruling in 
November 2008 (May 2006) and one in Q1 2009 (Q3 2006) and all quarters thereafter. The 
explanatory variable, Effect of Wizzgo Decision on French VC Investment (Effect of German 
Decisions on German VC Investment), a dummy variable capturing the interaction between the 
France Indicator (Germany Indicator) and the Q1 2009 Dummy (Q3 2006 or After Dummy), 
equals one for investment in French (German) cloud computing companies in Q1 2009 (Q3 
2006) and thereafter, and zero otherwise. Xr,t is a vector of other explanatory variables including 
GDP growth and broadband penetration that may be associated with investment in cloud 
companies. 
This difference-in-difference model is designed to estimate the parameter β3, which 
provides an estimate of the effect of the French and German rulings on investment in French and 
German cloud computing, respectively, controlling for trends in France and Germany relative to 
the EU (captured by the country indicators), and trends in cloud computing generally (captured 
by Q1 2009 or After Dummy and Q3 2006 or After Dummy) absent the policy. 
In order to focus more narrowly on the time period surrounding the French ruling, we 
analyze investment levels from 2006 to 2010. Doing so helps to eliminate long-term investment 
trends prior to 2006 from influencing the results. Similarly, in order to focus more narrowly on 
the time period surrounding the 2006 German District Court ruling, we first analyze investment 
levels from 2004 to 2008. We also investigate the effect over a longer time period, 2004 to 2010, 
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because additional court rulings were made in 2006, 2007, and 2009, and because the litigation 
involving Shift.tv and Safe.tv, to our knowledge, has not yet been completely resolved. 
Our first set of regression results are presented below in Table 11, and show that 
investment in venture-backed cloud computing companies is lower in France than in the EU after 
the Wizzgo ruling. The coefficient on β3 in Model 24, which provides an estimate of the effect of 
the Wizzgo ruling on VC investment in French cloud computing companies, is equal to -0.0185. 
This indicates that the increase in average VC investment in cloud computing in France as a 
percentage of VC investment in IT in France from the period Q1 2006 through Q4 2008 to the 
period Q1 2009 through Q4 2010 was approximately 1.85 percent lower than the corresponding 
rise in cloud computing investment in the EU. This estimate of β3, statistically significant at the 
90 percent confidence level, implies that VC investment in French cloud computing companies 
decreased, relative to the rest of the EU, by an average of $2.0 million per quarter after the 
Wizzgo ruling, or approximately $16 million in total for 2009 and 2010. 
Model 25 is similar to Model 24, except that it incorporates variables that control for GDP 
growth and broadband penetration. As shown in column 2 of Table 11, the coefficients on these 
control variables have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant. Interpretation of 
the other variables remains the same, and as shown in the table, the magnitude and significance 
of the Effect of Wizzgo Decision on French VC Investment are almost identical to its magnitude 
and significance in Model 24. 
Analogous regression results for Germany are presented in Table 11 and show that 
investment in venture-backed cloud computing companies is lower in Germany than in the EU 
after the 2006 German District Court ruling, both when a shorter post-ruling period is used (Q3 
2006 to Q4 2008) and when a longer post-ruling period is analyzed (Q3 2006 to Q4 2010). 
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Model 26, which estimates the estimate of the effect of the 2006 German District Court ruling on 
VC investment through the end of 2008, shows that the effect of the 2006 German District Court 
ruling (as well as other similar rulings that followed later in 2006 and 2007) on VC investment in 
German cloud computing companies is equal to -0.0115. This indicates that the change in 
average VC investment in cloud computing in Germany as a percentage of VC investment in IT 
in Germany from the period Q1 2004 through Q2 2006 to the period Q3 2006 through Q4 2008 
was approximately 1.15 percent lower than the corresponding rise in cloud computing 
investment in the EU. This estimate, statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, 
implies that VC investment in German cloud computing companies decreased, relative to the rest 
of the EU, by an average of $0.5 million per quarter after the 2006 German District Court ruling, 
or approximately $3 million in total from 3Q 2006 through 4Q 2008. 
Model 27 is similar to Model 26, except that it incorporates variables that control for GDP 
growth and broadband penetration. As shown in column 4 of Table 11, the coefficients on these 
control variables have the expected positive sign. Interpretation of the other variables remains the 
same, and as shown in the table, the magnitude and significance of the Effect of German 
Decisions on German VC Investment is almost identical to its magnitude and significance in 
Model 26. The implied decrease in German VC investment is nearly identical as well. 
As described above, the litigation involving Shift.tv and Safe.tv, to our knowledge, has not 
yet been completely resolved; as such, uncertainty likely exists regarding the viability of certain 
cloud business models in Germany. To investigate whether this ongoing legal uncertainty 
continued to depress VC investment in German cloud computing in 2009 and 2010, we also 
analyzed a longer post-ruling period (Q3 2006 to Q4 2010). These results, presented in Models 
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28 and 29 in Table 11, show that the magnitude and significance of the Effect of German 
Decisions on German VC Investment is similar to the estimates in Models 26 and 27. 
5.1. Additional Sensitivity Analyses and Robustness Checks 
5.1.1. Alternative Control Group Specifications 
We have also estimated a difference-in-difference model comparing investment in France 
and Germany to investment in the rest-of-the-world (ROW) in order to examine whether the 
results are sensitive to the use of EU companies as a control group. Specifically, we have 
conducted analyses analogous to Model 24 (France) and Models 26 and 27 (Germany) using 
ROW investment, rather than investment in the remainder of the EU, as a benchmark. These 
results are presented in Table 12 and are qualitatively similar, finding that the decrease in 
investment in French (German) venture-backed cloud computing companies, relative to the rest 
of the EU, amounted to an average of $0.9 million ($0.2 million) per quarter after the Wizzgo 
(German) ruling. 
5.1.2. Stationarity50 
To examine the extent to which the decrease in French and German investment subsequent 
to the French and German rulings, relative to the EU, reflects an ongoing trend, perhaps 
attributable to factors not reflected in any of the data we collected, we have conducted a variety 
of tests. First, we ran a simple ordinary least squares regression on the difference between French 
and EU investment levels against a time trend, as well as on the difference between German and 
EU investment levels against a time trend. This revealed that French investment levels relative to 
EU investment levels were falling on average, but not significantly, during the pre-ruling time 
                                                 
50  A stationary time series is one whose statistical properties such as mean, variance, and autocorrelation, are all 
constant over time. Most statistical methods are based on this assumption, and violations of stationarity can lead 
to biased point estimates. 
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period, and that German investment levels relative to EU investment levels were increasing on 
average, but not significantly, during the pre-ruling time period. 
To more formally test for stationarity in our time series data, we conducted three well-
known tests on our data: the Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–
Schmidt–Shin tests. Using each test, we found no evidence of non-stationarity. As such, our data 
appear to be stationary, and thus, we do not adjust our regression equations or data. 
5.1.3. Autocorrelation 
We also tested for the presence of autocorrelation in our regression analyses by conducting 
a test proposed by Jeffrey Wooldridge for panel data.51 After correcting for potential 
autocorrelation, the estimate of the effect of the French and German rulings remains significant 
and negative, and the implied increase in French and German cloud VC investment is 
qualitatively similar. 
5.1.4. Investment Levels (vs. Ratios) 
We ran additional sensitivities based on an alternate specification of the dependent 
variable. Specifically, we ran regressions analogous to Models 24 and 25 for France, and Models 
26 – 29 for Germany, where the dependent variable was the total quarterly cloud VC investment 
measured in dollars, rather than measured in terms of a ratio relative to total IT spending. Total 
other IT VC investment and total other VC investment in a given region were controlled for by 
their inclusion as separate independent variables in the regression analysis. The results of these 
regressions, presented in Table 13, show that the French and German rulings continue to have a 
negative and significant impact on cloud VC investment, although both the French and German 
results imply a larger decrease in cloud VC investment, relative to the EU, as compared to the 
                                                 
51  Wooldridge [2002]. 
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regressions in which cloud VC investment is measured in terms of a ratio relative to total IT 
spending. 
5.1.5. Investment Rounds (vs. Investment Ratios or Investment Levels) 
We also ran unreported regressions analogous to Models 24 and 26 for France, and Models 
26 – 29 for Germany, where the dependent variable was the number of rounds of VC investment 
received within a given quarter (in France, Germany, or the EU), rather than total quarterly 
investment measured in dollars or the ratio of total quarterly investment relative to total IT 
spending. Our results indicate that the effect of the French and German rulings on the number of 
French or German VC investment rounds is negative and significant in Germany, and negative, 
although insignificant in France. This suggests that our principal results are not being driven by a 
small number of large VC investments and provides further evidence that decisions around 
copyright protection can have significant impacts on VC investment. 
6. Conclusions 
The impact of property rights, and in particular its implications for investment, is an 
important issue in corporate finance. In this paper, we set out to address the impact of these 
changes in one particular case: by looking at the impact of unexpected judicial decisions that 
shifted the allocation of copyright protection on VC investment in cloud computing companies. 
We do so by analyzing the joint effects of the Cablevision decision and the French and German 
rulings on VC investment in the U.S. relative to the EU and across the U.S., as well as by 
separately analyzing the effects of the French and German court rulings on VC investment in 
French and German cloud computing companies. To that end, we constructed a dataset on VC 
investment in cloud computing companies and estimated multiple difference-in-difference 
regression models. 
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Our findings suggest that decisions around the allocation of copyright ownership can have 
significant impacts on investment in innovative enterprises. Specifically, we find that the 
Cablevision decision, along with court rulings in France and Germany, led to additional 
incremental investment in U.S. cloud computing companies compared to the EU experience. In 
addition, we find that French and German court rulings led to reduced investment in French and 
German cloud computing companies compared to all other EU countries. The more granular 
analyses, such as of the impact on funding in the Second District, support that the shift in the 
allocation of copyright protection has a major impact on investment.  
Taken together, our findings suggest that strong upstream property rights, combined with 
transaction costs that limited the ability to enter into licenses, can significantly deter investment 
in downstream innovations. We cannot assess the broader social welfare impact of these 
changes, since we cannot observe investment by large corporations or the long-run consequences 
of these shifts in property rights on the production of creative material. (Waldfogel [2011] argues 
that changes in effective copyright protection has had little impact on the development of high-
quality popular music, but much more work needs to be done.)  Nonetheless, the findings of this 
paper provide an empirical data point that helps illustrate an important and little studied issue. 
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Difference in the Ratio of Investment in Cloud Computing Companies 
to Investment in all IT Companies in the U.S. and EU
U.S. Cloud / IT - EU Cloud / IT
Cartoon Network v. Cablevision 
Appeals Court Decision
Source: Private Equity Investment data Jan 2006 - Dec 2010 from Thomson ONE.
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Independent Variables District Court Second Circuit
Number of Observations 22 25
Market Model Returns
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns -0.57% 1.16%
Positive: Negative Ratio 7:15 18:7
p-Value, Patell z-test 0.273 0.002***
p-Value, Generalized Sign Test 0.057* 0.008***
Market-Adjusted Returns
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns -0.48% 1.36%
Positive: Negative Ratio 8:14 18:7
p-Value, Patell z-test 0.292 0.001***
p-Value, Generalized Sign Test 0.126 0.015**
Length of Time Period March 22-23, 2007 August 4-5, 2008
Notes:
Table 1
Event Study Results: U.S. Cloud Computing Firms1
[0,+1] Window; Equal-Weighted Returns
Judicial Decision
[1] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent 
level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
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Independent Variables (1) (2)
U.S. Indicator 0.0201*** 0.0128***
(0.0048) (0.0045)
2008 Dummy3 0.0059 -0.0094
(0.0080) (0.0090)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment 0.0257** 0.0256**
(0.0114) (0.0095)
Percent Change in GDP 0.0093***
(0.0030)
Broadband Penetration Rate 0.3743***
(0.0900)
Constant 0.0117*** -0.0627***
(0.0038) (0.0167)
Observations 40 40
Adjusted R-Squared 0.544 0.699
Implied Increase in U.S. Cloud VC Investment 
($ Millions)
$730 $728
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 
Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Table 2
Cloud Computing Regression Results: U.S. vs. EU1,2
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Cloud Computing VC Dollars to
Total IT VC Dollars
Model
[1] Robust standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent 
level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
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Independent Variables (3) (4)
U.S. Indicator 0.0189** 0.0099
(0.0074) (0.0060)
2008 Dummy3 -0.0014 -0.0174
(0.0107) (0.0183)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment 0.0350** 0.0318**
(0.0169) (0.0155)
Percent Change in GDP 0.0058
(0.0044)
Broadband Penetration Rate 0.3594***
(0.0863)
Constant 0.0112* -0.0556***
(0.0059) (0.0136)
Observations 40 40
Implied Increase in U.S. Cloud VC Investment 
($ Millions)
$952 $904
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 
Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Table 3
Cloud Computing Quantile Regression Results: U.S. vs. EU1,2
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Cloud Computing VC Dollars to
Total IT VC Dollars
Model
[1] Robust standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent 
level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
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Independent Variables (5) (6)
U.S. Indicator 0.1089*** 0.0805***
(0.0275) (0.0285)
2008 Dummy3 0.1186** 0.0514
(0.0446) (0.0575)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment -0.0852* -0.0789
(0.0491) (0.0503)
Percent Change in GDP 0.0150
(0.0147)
Broadband Penetration Rate 1.2788***
(0.4496)
Constant 0.2030*** -0.0401
(0.0238) (0.0809)
Observations 40 40
Adjusted R-Squared 0.302 0.365
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 
Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Table 4
Cloud Computing Regression Results: U.S. vs. EU1,2
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Internet-Specific VC Dollars to
Total IT VC Dollars
Model
[1] Robust standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent 
level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
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Independent Variables (7) (8)
U.S. Indicator 0.0201*** 0.0128***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
2008 Dummy3 0.0059 -0.0094
(0.0057) (0.0068)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment 0.0257* 0.0256*
(0.0109) (0.0111)
Percent Change in GDP 0.0093**
(0.0018)
Broadband Penetration Rate 0.3743***
(0.0234)
Constant 0.0117*** -0.0627***
(0.0026) (0.0040)
Observations 40 40
Adjusted R-Squared 0.579 0.738
Implied Increase in U.S. Cloud VC Investment 
($ Millions)
$730 $728
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[2] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent 
level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
[3] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 
Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Model
Table 5
Cloud Computing Regression Results with Clustered Standard Errors:
U.S. vs. EU1,2
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Cloud Computing VC Dollars to
Total IT VC Dollars
[1] Clustered standard errors (by quarter) are provided under the point estimates in italics.
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Independent Variables (9) (10)
IT U.S. Minus Cloud VC Investment 0.0531 0.0586**
(0.0325) (0.0264)
Total VC Investment Minus IT Minus Cloud VC 0.0090 0.0002
Investment (0.0105) (0.0112)
U.S. Indicator -71.3537 -87.3035
(108.3648) (84.2297)
2008 Dummy3 7.4676 -23.4116
(8.8497) (26.4662)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment 118.7576* 126.1020**
(59.1897) (51.2073)
Percent Change in GDP 20.6408**
(9.2082)
Broadband Penetration Rate 707.0396*
(372.2410)
Constant -37.6883 -170.0521**
(22.7698) (71.2992)
Observations 40 40
Adjusted R-Squared 0.783 0.838
Implied Increase in U.S. Cloud VC Investment ($ Millions) $1,191 $1,268
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 Dummy 
variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Model
Cloud Computing Regression Results: U.S. vs. EU1,2
Dependent Variable: Cloud Computing VC Dollars
Table 6
[1] Robust standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and * 
indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
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(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
U.S. Indicator -0.054*** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.127 -0.127
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.101) (0.101)
2008 Dummy4 -0.884*** -1.584*** 17.742*** -1.772*** 6.345***
(0.000) (0.001) (4.249) (0.295) (1.561)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment 1.220*** 1.217*** 1.214*** 1.475*** 1.475***
(0.000) (0.012) (0.012) (0.310) (0.310)
Percent Change in GDP 7.819*** 3.593***
(1.612) (0.475)
Broadband Penetration Rate 78.141*** 83.760***
(6.404) (1.108)
Constant -2.345*** -1.278*** -46.826*** 17.045*** -16.397***
(0.000) (0.069) (5.335) (1.214) (2.167)
Quarter of Year Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
VC Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 5,539 5,539 5,539 4,512 4,512
Pseudo R-Squared 0.00670 0.0212 0.0212 0.156 0.156
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[2] Clustered standard errors (by region) are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[3] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
[4] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Table 7
Cloud Computing Regression Results: U.S. vs. EU1,2,3
Dependent Variable: Whether a Deal is a Cloud Deal (0/1)
Data are Restricted to Investments by VC firms Which Have Done at Least One Cloud Deal Previously
Model
[1] A logit model was used. If a deal is a cloud deal the binary dependent variable is equal to one; otherwise, it is equal to zero.
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Independent Variables (16) (17)
U.S. Indicator 15.5*** 13.4***
(1.9) (1.5)
2008 Dummy3 0.8 -3.7
(0.8) (2.4)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment 6.5* 6.6**
(3.8) (2.9)
Percent Change in GDP 2.2**
(1.0)
Broadband Penetration Rate 102.7***
(33.9)
Constant 1.2*** -19.0***
(0.3) (6.4)
Observations 40 40
Adjusted R-Squared 0.787 0.845
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 
Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Table 8
Cloud Computing Regression Results: U.S. vs. EU1,2
Dependent Variable: Number of Rounds of VC Investment
Model
[1] Robust standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent 
level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level.
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IaaS PaaS SaaS
Independent Variables (18) (19) (20)
U.S. Indicator 0.0026 0.0057*** 0.0151***
(0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0037)
2008 Dummy3 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0081
(0.0028) (0.0005) (0.0073)
Effect of Cablevision on U.S. VC Investment 0.0117** 0.0061** 0.0089
(0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0087)
Constant 0.0039 0.0003 0.0074
(0.0026) (0.0003) (0.0026)
Observations 40 40 40
Adjusted R-Squared 0.389 0.546 0.448
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed)  (8/4/2008). The 2008 Dummy variable is set 
equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Model
Table 9
Cloud Computing Regression Results: U.S. vs. EU1,2
Dependent Variable: For Each of IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS, Ratio of Cloud Computing VC 
Dollars to Total IT VC Dollars
[1] Robust standard errors (by quarter) are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and * indicates 
significance at a 10 percent level.
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Independent Variables (21) (22) (23)
2nd Circuit Indicator -1.148*** -1.205*** -1.200***
(0.181) (0.179) (0.179)
2008 Dummy4 0.626*** -0.228 1.029*
(0.079) (0.206) (0.569)
Effect of Cablevision on 2nd Circuit VC Investment 0.704*** 0.708*** 0.716***
(0.084) (0.087) (0.086)
Percent Change in GDP 0.418**
(0.180)
Broadband Penetration Rate 1.861
(6.720)
Constant -3.430*** -2.031*** -4.363***
(0.132) (0.202) (1.313)
Quarter of Year Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes
Observations 29,356 29,356 29,356
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0143 0.0277 0.0251
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[5] 2nd Circuit Court's jurisdiction covers the states of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont.
[3] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and * indicates 
significance at a 10 percent level.
[4] Decision by Appellate Court (judgment of District Court is reversed) (8/4/2008). The 2008 Dummy variable is set 
equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2008.
Table 10
Cloud Computing Regression Results: 2nd Circuit Court vs. Rest of U.S.1,2,3,4,5
Dependent Variable: Whether a Deal is a Cloud Deal (0/1)
Model
[1] A logit model was used. If a deal is a cloud deal the binary dependent variable is equal to one; otherwise, it is equal 
to zero.
[2] Clustered standard errors (by state) are provided under the point estimates in italics.
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Independent Variables (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
France Indicator -0.0125*** -0.0207***
(0.0041) (0.0060)
Q1 2009 Dummy2 0.0223** 0.0175*
(0.0092) (0.0091)
Effect of the Wizzgo Decision on French -0.0185* -0.0176*
VC Investment (0.0095) (0.0089)
Germany Indicator -0.0031* -0.0026 -0.0031* -0.0029
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0028)
Q3 2006 Dummy3 0.0115** 0.0103* 0.0205*** 0.0098
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0094)
Effect of German Decisions on German -0.0115** -0.0133** -0.0156** -0.0233***
VC Investment (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0065)
Percent Change in GDP 0.0042** 0.0020 0.0025
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Broadband Penetration Rate 0.1406** 0.0270 0.1181
(0.0641) (0.0317) (0.0821)
Constant 0.0125*** -0.0137 0.0031* -0.0010 0.0031* -0.0102
(0.0041) (0.0112) (0.0018) (0.0042) (0.0017) (0.0089)
Observations 40 40 40 40 56 56
R-Squared 0.500 0.535 0.396 0.418 0.256 0.311
Implied Quarterly Decrease in Cloud 
VC Investment ($ Millions)
-2.0 -1.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.9
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2008 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2008 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by the German District Court against Shift.tv on May 12, 2006. The 2006 Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2006. 
Additional decisions include an Appeals Court ruling against Shift.tv on November 28, 2006, a District Court ruling against Save.tv on May 9, 2007, an Appeals 
Court ruling in favor of Save.tv on October 9, 2007, and a Federal Court decision in which the cases against Shift.tv and Save.tv were remanded back to the 
Appeals Court on April 22, 2009.
Table 11
Cloud Computing Regression Results: France and Germany vs. the EU
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Cloud Computing VC Dollars to Total IT VC Dollars1
Model
[1] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level. Robust 
standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] Decision by Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris in November of 2008. The 2009 Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 4Q 2008.
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Independent Variables (30) (31) (32)
France Indicator -0.0057*
(0.0028)
Q1 2009 Dummy2 0.0117***
(0.0037)
Effect of the Wizzgo Decision on French VC Investment -0.0079*
(0.0045)
Germany Indicator -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Q3 2006 Dummy3 0.0056* 0.0104***
(0.0033) (0.0026)
Effect of German Decisions on German VC Investment -0.0056* -0.0054
(0.0033) (0.0056)
Constant 0.0057* 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0028) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations 40 40 56
R-Squared 0.467 0.239 0.111
Implied Quarterly Decrease in French Cloud VC 
Investment ($ Millions)
-0.9
Implied Quarterly Decrease in German Cloud VC 
Investment ($ Millions)
-0.2 -0.2
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2008 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by the German District Court against Shift.tv on May 12, 2006. The 2006 Dummy variable is set equal to 
one for all quarters after 2Q 2006. Additional decisions include an Appeals Court ruling against Shift.tv on 
November 28, 2006, a District Court ruling against Save.tv on May 9, 2007, an Appeals Court ruling in favor of 
Save.tv on October 9, 2007, and a Federal Court decision in which the cases against Shift.tv and Save.tv were 
remanded back to the Appeals Court on April 22, 2009.
Table 12
Cloud Computing Regression Results: France and Germany vs. ROW
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Cloud Computing VC Dollars to Total IT VC Dollars1
Model
[1] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and * indicates 
significance at a 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] Decision by Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris in November of 2008. The 2009 Dummy variable is set equal to 
one for all quarters after 4Q 2008.
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Independent Variables (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38)
French IT Minus Cloud VC 0.0203*** 0.0195*** 0.0119 -0.0129* 0.0144* 0.0144*
Investment (0.0067) (0.0062) (0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0078) (0.0073)
Total French VC Investment 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0033
Minus IT Minus Cloud VC Investment (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0032)
France Indicator 1.6962 -3.0309
(3.2316) (4.1813)
Q1 2009 Dummy2 10.3236** 8.0265**
(3.8434) (3.9036)
Effect of the Wizzgo Decision on French -9.9446** -8.1107**
VC Investment (3.8490) (3.4266)
Germany Indicator 1.8987 1.9702 1.8041 1.6259
(2.4262) (2.3332) (1.8319) (1.9181)
Q3 2006 Dummy3 3.7146 3.9986 7.5471*** 6.7182**
(2.5231) (2.4620) (2.3380) (2.6475)
Effect of German Decisions on German -3.7622 -4.9726* -7.2437*** -9.0964***
VC Investment (2.5160) (2.8590) (2.3567) (2.7749)
Percent Change in GDP 2.7005** 1.5993 1.4356
(1.0572) (1.0032) (0.8902)
Broadband Penetration Rate 63.7616** 9.6318 18.5790
(31.1572) (16.3778) (12.9991)
Constant -3.8858 -14.9104*** -2.3038 -3.9396 -2.1293 -4.3394**
(3.8896) (5.1048) (2.7809) (2.4841) (2.0958) (1.8465)
Observations 40 40 40 40 56 56
R-Squared 0.571 0.628 0.448 0.495 0.472 0.513
Implied Quarterly Decrease in French 
Cloud VC Investment ($ Millions)
-9.9 -8.1 -3.8 -5.0 -7.2 -9.1
Length of Time Period 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2006 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2008 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2008 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2010 1Q 2004 - 4Q 2010
Notes:
[3] Decision by the German District Court against Shift.tv on May 12, 2006. The 2006 Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 2Q 2006. 
Additional decisions include an Appeals Court ruling against Shift.tv on November 28, 2006, a District Court ruling against Save.tv on May 9, 2007, an Appeals 
Court ruling in favor of Save.tv on October 9, 2007, and a Federal Court decision in which the cases against Shift.tv and Save.tv were remanded back to the 
Appeals Court on April 22, 2009.
Table 13
Cloud Computing Regression Results: France and Germany vs. the EU
Dependent Variable: Cloud Computing VC Dollars1
Model
[1] *** indicates significance at a 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and * indicates significance at a 10 percent level. Robust 
standard errors are provided under the point estimates in italics.
[2] Decision by Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris in November of 2008. The 2009 Dummy variable is set equal to one for all quarters after 4Q 2008.
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Appendix A - Cablevision  Decision
Summary Statistics for Investment Levels and Regression Variables
Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total
$92.3 $88.0 $0.0 $71.8 $406.5 $5,906.3 $131.0 $39.9 $72.9 $125.8 $191.1 $1,309.7 $184.7 $84.9 $58.8 $176.6 $369.4 $1,847.1
2.2% 2.3% 0.0% 1.6% 11.5% 3.2% 0.9% 1.8% 3.0% 4.6% 6.3% 2.4% 3.1% 6.1% 11.5%
$3.8 $7.4 $0.0 $0.0 $34.0 $242.3 $7.0 $7.7 $0.0 $4.5 $20.5 $69.9 $8.9 $11.5 $0.0 $3.7 $34.0 $88.7
0.7% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 6.4% 1.2% 1.2% 0.0% 0.9% 3.6% 1.8% 2.2% 0.0% 0.8% 6.4%
0.6% 0.7% -2.3% 0.7% 2.0% 0.4% 0.5% -0.4% 0.4% 1.3% -0.1% 1.2% -2.3% 0.5% 1.0%
0.5% 0.6% -2.6% 0.5% 1.2% 0.7% 0.4% -0.3% 0.7% 1.0% -0.3% 1.1% -2.6% 0.3% 1.0%
17.7% 7.4% 5.4% 18.6% 27.7% 20.7% 2.6% 16.6% 20.8% 23.9% 26.1% 0.8% 24.7% 25.9% 27.7%
15.0% 8.4% 2.0% 15.8% 26.0% 18.2% 3.0% 13.5% 18.5% 22.2% 24.6% 1.0% 22.8% 24.9% 26.0%
Notes and Sources:
[1] Thomson ONE Private Equity data, Jan 1995 to Dec 2010.
[2] OECD real GDP growth from the previous quarter.
[3] OECD broadband penetration rate.
VC Investment in EU 
Cloud as % of VC 
Investment in E.U. IT1
Real U.S. GDP Growth 
Rate Prior Quarter2
Real EU GDP Growth 
Rate Prior Quarter2
U.S. Broadband 
Penetration Rate3
EU Broadband 
Penetration Rate3
VC Investment in EU 
Cloud ($ Millions)1
Q1 1995 - Q4 2010 Pre Cablevision: Q1 2006 - Q2 2008 Post Cablevision: Q3 2008 - Q4 2010
VC Investment in U.S. 
Cloud ($ Millions)1
VC Investment in U.S. 
Cloud as % of VC 
Investment in U.S. IT1
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Appendix B - French Ruling
Summary Statistics for Investment Levels and Regression Variables
Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total
$0.056 $0.321 $0.000 $0.000 $2.199 $3.561 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.445 $0.854 $0.000 $0.000 $2.199 $3.561
0.05% 0.28% 0.00% 0.00% 1.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38% 0.72% 0.00% 0.00% 1.70%
$3.645 $7.301 $0.000 $0.000 $32.645 $233.303 $5.900 $7.388 $0.000 $3.070 $20.500 $70.800 $9.840 $12.037 $0.000 $3.707 $32.645 $78.720
0.91% 1.88% 0.00% 0.00% 8.79% 1.25% 1.41% 0.00% 0.65% 3.83% 2.76% 2.87% 0.00% 1.97% 8.13%
0.41% 0.51% -1.58% 0.53% 1.31% 0.19% 0.69% -1.45% 0.37% 1.07% 0.10% 0.71% -1.58% 0.34% 0.60%
0.53% 0.61% -2.33% 0.62% 1.34% 0.31% 0.90% -1.84% 0.69% 1.04% -0.03% 1.00% -2.33% 0.30% 0.75%
18.01% 10.44% 1.57% 18.84% 33.66% 22.54% 3.75% 16.31% 22.95% 27.64% 30.95% 1.91% 28.30% 30.92% 33.66%
13.61% 7.31% 1.78% 14.97% 22.62% 17.75% 2.83% 12.88% 18.14% 21.41% 21.57% 0.87% 20.15% 21.60% 22.62%
Notes and Sources:
[1] Thomson ONE Private Equity data, Jan 1995 to Dec 2010.
[2] OECD real GDP grwoth from the previous quarter
[3] OECD broadband penetration rate.
VC Investment in EU Cloud ($ 
Millions)1
Q1 1995 - Q4 2010 Pre-Wizzgo Decision: Q1 2006 - Q4 2008 Post-Wizzgo Decision:: Q1 2009 - Q4 2010
VC Investment in French Cloud ($ 
Millions)1
VC Investment in French Cloud as 
% of VC Investment in French IT1
VC Investment in EU Cloud as % 
of VC Investment in E.U. IT1
Real French GDP Growth Rate 
Prior Quarter2
Real EU GDP Growth Rate Prior 
Quarter2
French Broadband Penetration 
Rate3
EU Broadband Penetration Rate3
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Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total Mean Std Dev Min Med Max Total Mean
Std 
Dev Min Med Max Total Mean Std Dev Min Med Max Total
$0.087 $0.690 $0.000 $0.000 $5.473 $5.473 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.304 $1.290 $0.000 $0.000 $5.473 $5.473
0.15% 1.15% 0.00% 0.00% 8.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.49% 2.09% 0.00% 0.00% 8.86%
$3.645 $7.301 $0.000 $0.000 $32.645 $233.303 $3.514 $7.094 $0.000 $0.000 $22.710 $35.140 $6.913 $7.728 $0.000 $4.545 $20.500 $69.126 $8.214 $9.671 $0.000 $4.483 $32.645 $147.846
0.91% 1.88% 0.00% 0.00% 8.79% 1.18% 2.73% 0.00% 0.00% 8.79% 1.46% 1.46% 0.00% 1.30% 3.83% 2.04% 2.23% 0.00% 1.59% 8.13%
0.32% 0.88% -4.01% 0.36% 1.95% 0.44% 0.57% -0.15% 0.29% 1.51% 0.27% 1.03% -2.17% 0.62% 1.22% 0.24% 1.36% -4.01% 0.62% 1.95%
0.53% 0.61% -2.33% 0.62% 1.34% 0.71% 0.23% 0.36% 0.75% 0.99% 0.19% 0.94% -1.84% 0.64% 1.04% 0.09% 0.94% -2.33% 0.41% 1.04%
17.21% 10.31% 3.14% 16.55% 31.93% 10.10% 3.16% 6.01% 9.71% 15.01% 22.72% 3.81% 16.55% 23.07% 27.44% 26.17% 4.91% 16.55% 27.16% 31.93%
13.61% 7.31% 1.78% 14.97% 22.62% 9.54% 2.83% 5.52% 9.40% 13.97% 18.61% 2.18% 14.97% 19.00% 21.41% 19.93% 2.26% 14.97% 20.54% 22.62%
Notes and Sources:
[1] Thomson ONE Private Equity data, Jan 1995 to Dec 2010.
[2] OECD real GDP grwoth from the previous quarter
[3] OECD broadband penetration rate.
German Broadband Penetration 
Rate3
EU Broadband Penetration 
Rate3
Post-German District Court decision: Q3 2006 - Q4 2010
Appendix C - German Ruling
Summary Statistics for Investment Levels and Regression Variables
VC Investment in German 
Cloud as % of VC Investment 
in German IT1
VC Investment in EU Cloud ($ 
Millions)1
VC Investment in EU Cloud as 
% of VC Investment in E.U. IT1
Real German GDP Growth Rate 
Prior Quarter2
Real EU GDP Growth Rate Prior 
Quarter2
Q1 1995 - Q4 2010 Pre-German District Court decision: Q1 2004 - Q2 2006 Post-German District Court decision: Q3 2006 - Q4 2008
VC Investment in German 
Cloud ($ Millions)1
